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Working memory (WM), an important posit in cognitive science, allows one to
temporarily store and manipulate information in the service of ongoing tasks. WM has
been traditionally classified as an explicit memory system—that is, as operating on and
maintaining only consciously perceived information. Recently, however, several studies
have questioned this assumption, purporting to provide evidence for unconscious WM.
In this article, we focus on visual working memory (VWM) and critically examine these
studies as well as studies of unconscious perception that seem to provide indirect
evidence for unconscious WM. Our analysis indicates that current evidence does not
support an unconscious WM store, though we offer independent reasons to think that
WM may operate on unconsciously perceived information.
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INTRODUCTION
Working memory (WM), the capacity to temporarily store and manipulate information in the
service of ongoing tasks (Baddeley, 1986), has been correlated with an array of cognitive abilities,
including text comprehension, analytical thinking and general intelligence (Fukuda et al., 2010;
Johnson et al., 2013). WM, and especially visual working memory (VWM), has also traditionally
been linked to perceptual consciousness—that is, it is often assumed to operate on and maintain
only consciously perceived information (Baddeley, 1986; Prinz, 2012; Carruthers, 2015).
The goal of this article is to explore whether or not the contents of VWM are invariably
conscious. Though some recent studies purport to demonstrate unconscious VWM (Soto et al.,
2011; Bergström and Eriksson, 2014), these results have been variously challenged (Prinz, 2012;
Carruthers, 2015; Stein et al., 2016). We explore here many of these critiques, as well as several
studies not previously discussed, often pursuing different lines of response. Though our analysis
likewise indicates that current evidence does not support unconscious VWM, we offer independent
reasons to think that WMmay operate on unconsciously perceived information.
WORKING MEMORY
A major complicating factor in the debate over the existence of unconscious VWM is that there
remains much uncertainty about how best to model the phenomenon of WM, consciously or
otherwise. Thus we begin in this section by briefly exploring current models of WM and VWM.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 1 March 2018 | Volume 12 | Article 78
Persuh et al. Working Memory and Consciousness
Current Models of WM
Like both short-term memory (STM) and long-term memory
(LTM; Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1968), WM is typically
characterized in terms of its functionality. Following the majority
of the psychological literature, we define ‘‘WM’’ as the storage
system responsible for the maintenance of information in the
service of ongoing work—that is, the system that makes available
stored information for task-based manipulation—without
imposing a limit on its duration or relationship to LTM (Miller
et al., 1960; Baddeley, 1986; Luck and Vogel, 2013).
Though perhaps the most influential account of WM is
the multicomponent model proposed by Baddeley and Hitch
(1974)—which includes two storage systems (a phonological
loop and visuospatial sketchpad), a central executive, and
more recently an episodic buffer (Baddeley, 2000)—this
view has been slowly superseded by more recent state-based
models (reviewed in Larocque et al., 2014). Rather than
postulating the existence of different systems (buffers) for
different memory components, state-based models propose
that attention to internal representations such as sensory,
motoric, or LTM representations results in different states
of information activation. State-based cognitive models have
received much experimental support from contemporary
cognitive neuroscience.
Cowan (1995), for example, proposes that information inWM
exists in one of two states: a capacity-limited state, the so-called
‘‘focus of attention’’ (FoA), or in a capacity-unlimited state called
‘‘activated LTM’’, which shows temporal decay (see alsoMcElree,
1998; Oberauer, 2002). Such models have been developed to
address a set of behavioral findings. For example, Oberauer
(2001, 2002) used a retro-cue during a delay period to indicate
relevant items from the memory set for the upcoming task.
Cued items received attentional prioritization (FoA), whereas
uncued items, which were not forgotten, were presumably stored
in activated LTM. State-based models dubbed ‘‘sensory’’ or
‘‘sensorimotor-recruitment’’ models have also been developed
for perceptual stimuli (Magnussen, 2000; Awh and Jonides,
2001).
Since arguably the most emphasized characteristic of WM is
its storage-capacity limit, much work has focused on this aspect
of the phenomenon. Two of the most widely cited studies are
Miller’s (1956) and Cowan’s (2001), who reported an average
capacity of seven items and four items, respectively, for verbal
WM. In the visual domain, Luck and Vogel (1997) reported an
average capacity of around four individual objects. According to
so-called ‘‘slot models’’ of VWM, individual items are stored in a
limited number of slots, whereas other items are discarded (Luck
and Vogel, 1997). Continuous-resource models, by contrast,
treat VWM as highly limited in capacity while allowing the
distribution of resources among all items (Ma et al., 2014).
According to these models, the number of items remembered is
not a fundamental metric, but rather the precision (quality) of
memory. A recent variable-precision model further suggests that
VWM precision varies from trial to trial and from item to item
(Fougnie et al., 2012; van den Berg et al., 2012).
Although it is clear that VWM is limited in capacity, there is
currently no agreement about the nature of these limits. Several
authors have demonstrated how slot and resource approaches
could blend into one another (Souza et al., 2014); it seems likely
that a final model, firmly grounded in neural data, will involve
aspects of both slot and continuous-resource models (Wolfe,
2014).
In addition, much recent experimentation has attempted to
identify the neural underpinnings on WM. Since the discovery
of the persistent neuronal activity in monkey prefrontal cortex
(PFC) during the delay interval of a WM task (Fuster and
Alexander, 1971; Kubota and Niki, 1971) and related findings
in human PFC with fMRI (Courtney et al., 1997; Zarahn
et al., 1997), it was widely believed that such activity reflects
maintenance of WM representations.
This interpretation was, however, questioned when two
prominent studies showed that stimulus information during
delay periods can be decoded from primary visual cortex
with multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) of fMRI data in
the absence of elevated signal levels (Harrison and Tong,
2009; Serences et al., 2009). Furthermore, by using a multiple
step retro-cue design to specify the relevant items in a WM
task, Lewis-Peacock et al. (2012) showed that MVPA evidence
for the non-cued item dropped to the baseline, even though
the item could be retrieved by a second retro-cue. These
results suggest that persistent neural activity is not necessary
to maintain item representations in WM. One prominent
idea is that representations are sustained by modification
of synaptic weights (Mongillo et al., 2008). A recent study
provided converging evidence by using TMS instead of a second
retro-cue, to activate memory for the non-cued item (Rose et al.,
2016).
Experimental evidence suggests that several neural
mechanisms, from intracellular to network based, contribute to
WM (for an excellent review see D’Esposito and Postle, 2015).
These findings support state-based models, and eliminate the
need for specialized buffers. It has been suggested that because
persistent neural activity or modulation of synaptic weights is
likely a property of most neurons, WM representations arguably
can be encoded by neuronal networks virtually anywhere in the
brain (D’Esposito and Postle, 2015).
Varieties of Visual Short-Term Memory
A related obstacle to the study of unconscious VWM is the
difficulty in distinguishing its operation from the operation of
other visual short-termmemory (VSTM) stores. In a well-known
study that employed partial report, Sperling (1960) demonstrated
the existence of a high-capacity, but limited-duration memory
store that he termed ‘‘iconic memory’’. When post cued,
participants were able to report letters from any row of a
multi-row letter display. Although this memory store has a
high capacity, it decays rapidly on the order of hundreds of
milliseconds. According to the classical view, only a few items,
selected from iconic memory by attentional mechanisms, form
more durable and robust representations that last for several
seconds, constituting VWM.
More recently, another type of VSTM has been proposed,
so-called ‘‘fragile VSTM’’ (Sligte et al., 2008, 2010), which
purportedly has a lower capacity than iconic memory, retains
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high-resolution representations, and decays linearly over several
seconds. According to this proposal, VSTM consists of two
limited-duration systems, iconic memory and fragile VSTM,
which store many high-resolution representations. These are
distinguished from the more robust and durable VWM,
which has no duration parameters and stores only one or
few high-resolution representations. The existence of fragile
VSTM as opposed to mere iconic memory, however, remains
controversial (Matsukura and Hollingworth, 2011).
Despite the debate over the fundamental nature of VWM
and how it differs from other memory stores, we nonetheless
believe that it is possible to assess the current state of evidence for
and the possibility of unconscious VWM. In the ‘‘Unconscious
VWM’’ section, we explore some of the reasons that theorists
have assumed that the contents of VWM are invariably
conscious and offer reasons to think that this assumption is
questionable.
UNCONSCIOUS VWM
Though it is typically assumed that the contents of VWM
are always or even must be conscious, the idea that VSTM
systems can store unconsciously perceived information for
brief durations—on the order of hundreds of milliseconds—is
largely uncontroversial (but see Phillips and Block, 2016). Here,
we follow most experimentalists working on consciousness
by defining visual conscious perception as the subjective
experience or visibility of stimuli. Perceptual consciousness can
be operationalized (measured) either by objective or subjective
measures (Seth et al., 2008).
Researchers have used a variety of experimental paradigms
to demonstrate unconscious perception (Kim and Blake,
2005). In a standard masked-priming experiment, for example,
stimuli are presented briefly and masked so that they are
rendered invisible; yet such stimuli are nonetheless thought
to be perceived unconsciously because they prime or affect
downstream behavioral responses (Kouider and Dehaene, 2007).
In some experimental paradigms, stimuli are masked and
presented for longer durations (Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005; Persuh
et al., 2016). Some type of memory store is implicated in
such studies, as behavioral responses are performed in the
absence of the perceived objects. We have strong experimental
evidence for unconscious response inhibition, a form of
cognitive control (van Gaal et al., 2008, 2010, 2012) and
for unconsciously deployed metacognitive judgments (Charles
et al., 2013). These are higher order cognitive functions,
closely associated with WM. Recently, direct evidence for
unconscious iconic memory storage has been provided (Sergent
et al., 2013; Thibault et al., 2016; Xia et al., 2016). Why,
then, do so many assume a link between consciousness and
VWM?
Associating Consciousness and VWM
Perhaps the central reason for this assumption is that many
maintain that there is a commonsense tie between WM and
consciousness. Stein et al. (2016), for example, write that:
WM corresponds well to our everyday phenomenology of ‘‘keeping
in mind’’ some information over a short period of time. From this
phenomenology, it seems clear that WM is intricately interwoven
with conscious awareness. It is difficult to imagine a situation
in which we are not consciously aware of the stimuli that enter
WM (p. 1).
That many assume a folk-psychological connection between
consciousness and WM is consistent with the long history
within consciousness studies of assuming that many or even all
high-level mental activity requires consciousness (for review see
Rosenthal, 2008; Shea and Frith, 2016).
Unsurprisingly, then, many models of consciousness or
WM implicitly build one phenomenon into the other. Baddeley
(2000), for example, modified his original multicomponent
model to include an episodic-buffer, which he conceives of
as acting as a global workspace (GWS) in Baars’s (1988)
terminology. The GWS is purportedly a central neural
module, which enjoys long-range connections to many
areas of the brain; it is thus capable of making information
encoded in it available for widespread impact on many
neural functions and behavior. According to GWS theories
of consciousness (Baars’s, 1988; Dehaene and Naccache,
2001), the representations in the GWS determine the contents
of consciousness. Much neuroimaging data supports GWS
theories, purportedly showing that the difference between
conscious and unconscious perception consists in differing
activations of frontal/parietal areas and widespread connections
to other areas (but see Siclari et al., 2017). Although on Baars’s
(1997) own view the contents of WM need not necessarily
be conscious, on Baddeley’s GWS-based model of WM, the
contents of VWM are invariably conscious (see Carruthers,
2015).
Similarly, Prinz’s (2000, 2012) attended intermediate-level
representation theory of consciousness identifies the contents of
consciousness with appropriately attended representations at the
intermediate level inspired by Marr’s (1982) and Jackendoff’s
(1987) models of the visual system, and since Prinz equates
the relevant kind of attention with the gateway to WM, he
likewise holds that only those representations that are available
to WM are conscious. Such accounts thereby rule out the
unconscious operation of VWM. There are, however, many
theoretical reasons to be skeptical that VWM must take as input
consciously perceived information only.
Dissociating Consciousness and VWM
First, we note that the functional characterization of VWM
offered at the outset—that is, a limited-capacity system that
allows one to store and manipulate information—is theoretically
neutral insofar as it does not invoke consciousness. If
this characterization of VWM is fair, then it remains an
open experimental question whether unconsciously perceived
information can be encoded in VWM.
Indeed, it is far from obvious that folk psychology includes a
tie betweenWM and consciousness. Since common sense admits
of unconscious perceptual states, it would seem at least open
that it also includes the possibility that we can ‘‘keep in mind’’
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unconsciously perceived information over a short time. Even if
Stein, Kaiser and Hessemann were correct that it is somewhat
difficult to generate clear examples of such events, it may simply
be because such encoding in VWM is unconscious—and so we
are unaware from the first-person perspective that this encoding
is occurring.
The assumption that higher mental functions require
consciousness is increasingly suspect (Shea and Frith, 2016),
and many independently motivated accounts of consciousness
do not involve any assumptions about the nature of the
contents available to WM. For example, Tononi’s (2004)
integrated-information theory, according to which mental
states are conscious just in case they reach a suitable level
of information integration, does not theoretically require
that visual contents encoded in VWM exceed the relevant
threshold of integration. Likewise, higher-order theories of
consciousness, according to which a mental state is conscious
just in case one is suitably aware of oneself as being in it
(Armstrong, 1968; Rosenthal, 2005), provide no reason to
think that we must be so aware of the contents that are
made available to VWM. These theories of consciousness
have experimental support (Lau and Rosenthal, 2011;
Tononi et al., 2016) and are consistent with unconscious
VWM.
With the development of state-based models of WM, the
link between consciousness and WM can be reformulated by
asking whether a specific WM state only takes as input conscious
information. It seems likely that nonattended information in
activated LTM can be represented unconsciously. It has been
suggested that perhaps different states of WM correspond to
conscious (FoA) and unconscious (activated LTM) information,
rather than attended and unattended information (Silvanto,
2017). It might seem obvious that information in the FoA should
always be conscious, but that is not necessarily so, as we can
attend to unconscious stimuli (Norman et al., 2013).
The possibility of unconscious VWM is thus interesting in
at least two ways. First, it remains an independently interesting
question to determine what, if any, mental functions must
occur consciously (Berger, 2014). Second, convincing evidence of
unconscious WM would require reevaluation and perhaps even
rejection of some theories of consciousness.
CURRENT EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
FOR UNCONSCIOUS VWM
Several studies have attempted to demonstrate unconscious
VWM.
Unconscious Operation of VWM
In perhaps the earliest explicit attempt to demonstrate
the unconscious operation of VWM, Hassin et al. (2009)
presented participants with a rapid series of disks and
participants were required to press a button to indicate
whether the disks were filled or unfilled. Unbeknownst to the
participants, in some conditions the series of disks formed a
pattern, which would indicate whether or not a forthcoming
disk would be filled. Although participants in the pattern
conditions were not able to report on these patterns, they
were faster at determining whether the disks were filled
than in the non-pattern conditions. Hassin et al. (2009)
argue that this task required the unconscious operation of
VWM because it was necessary for participants to hold in
memory a series of disks and compare them to visible disks to
determine whether or not they formed a pattern, even though
participants did not consciously hold or compare the disks in
memory.
Proponents of the view that the contents of VWM are
necessarily conscious have offered various critiques of this study.
Prinz (2012, p. 96), for example, proposes reasonably that since
the stimuli are quite complex, they likely outstrip the limited
capacity of VWM and instead implicate fragile VSTM (see
Carruthers, 2015, p. 86).
But whether or not these stimuli engage only VSTM, it is
crucial to note that in all five of these experiments the stimuli
were fully visible. Thus, as Carruthers (2015, p. 86) observes, such
results arguably demonstrate only that the computed pattern and
the resultant expectations are not among the contents of WM,
and that this does not show that VWM encodes unconsciously
perceived information, and similar considerations likewise
undermine what may seem to be evidence of unconscious
VWM from experiments involving implicit change detection.
Several studies have reported unconscious change detection: for
example, studies have found that implicit change detection in the
orientation of an item influenced performance on subsequent
orientation-judgment tasks (Fernandez-Duque and Thornton,
2000). At first sight, this might seem like de facto evidence of
unconscious VWM. However, stimuli in these tasks were also
fully visible and the delay between two displays was only 250 ms,
which arguably is an interval that taps into other types of VSTM
rather than VWM.
In other words, reflection on this work reveals an important
distinction in types of studies of unconscious VWM. First,
there is the question of whether or not the manipulations of
VWM content require consciousness—what we call henceforth
the ‘‘unconscious operation’’ of VWM. This is, however, distinct
from the question of whether or not unconsciously perceived
information can be encoded in VWM. This latter question is our
central interest here.
Other recent studies have likewise provided evidence for the
unconscious operation of VWM, albeit more indirectly (Bona
et al., 2013; Bona and Silvanto, 2014). Bona et al. (2013),
for example, examined the relationship between performance
and conscious experience in VSTM task. A memory cue was
followed, after a delay, by a probe stimulus and participants
reported the orientation of probe relative to the memory cue
in a forced-choice procedure. After performing a discrimination
task, participants reported their conscious experience of the
cue stimulus. On half of the trials, masked distractors were
presented during the delay period and participants also rated
their conscious experience of distractors. Data from this
study revealed a double dissociation between performance
and conscious experience. Discrimination performance was
negatively affected only when distractors differed significantly
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from cue orientation, regardless of distractor visibility. Cue
visibility showed the opposite pattern: visibility was unaffected
by distractor orientation. Cue visibility ratings were, however,
lower for invisible distractors. These results led authors to
conclude that the VSTM memory trace, on which performance
is based, is different from the content of conscious experience
of VSTM. Furthermore, this evidence led to the proposal of
separate representation for conscious experience, a so-called
‘‘conscious copy’’ model of WM introspection (Jacobs and
Silvanto, 2015).
Although cue stimuli in VSTM task in Bona et al. (2013)
were fully visible and thus cannot directly reveal whether
or not unconscious content of VWM is possible, a double
dissociation, if independently confirmed, would nonetheless
provide indirect evidence for the unconscious operation of
VWM. But a simpler explanation of their results would be
as follows. The distractor images modified the cue memory
representations—with larger deviations in distractor orientations
causing larger shifts in cue memory representations—which in
turn affected forced-choice discrimination performance while
leaving the vividness of the conscious experience of cue memory
intact. In other words, one’s conscious experience of a cue is
different for different distractor orientations, but equally vivid;
one can represent different orientations, equally vividly. It is
also possible that invisible distractors modify the vividness
of cue memory without affecting forced-choice discrimination
performance. Even with lower visibility, participants might have
had enough orientation information to sustain performance.
This reasoning would explain double dissociation results
without invoking an additional ‘‘conscious copy’’ representation
in WM.
We turn in the ‘‘Unconscious Content of VWM’’ section to
studies that more directly assess the question of whether or not
unconsciously perceived information can make it into VWM.
Unconscious Content of VWM
In a series of four experiments, Soto et al. (2011) presented
participants with a masked Gabor patch, to prevent the patch
from being consciously perceived. Participants were instructed
to keep this cue in memory. After a delay of several seconds,
a second Gabor patch, the target, was presented. Participants
were then asked to perform cue-target orientation discrimination
and to report their awareness of the cue on a scale from 1 to 4,
with 1 indicating no visibility. In some experiments, a distractor
was presented after the cue or participants were presented with
two cues. In all four experiments, orientation discrimination was
above chance level (50%) for trials with visibility ratings of 1.
The authors suggested that data support the existence of
unconscious VWM rather than a mere priming effect mainly
due to the above-chance performance despite the presence of a
distractor and because the gap between cue and target was 5 s in
some experiments. These factors purport to show that the cues
were held in memory during an ongoing task, and so in VWM.
Some critics of unconscious VWM allege that these results
can be explained without appeal to it. Prinz (2012, p. 86),
for example, urges that the fact that Soto and colleagues
did not find any decrease in performance even after delays
of up to 5 s suggests that fragile VSTM, and not VWM,
is implicated insofar as VWM putatively shows signs of
decay at around 4 s (Zhang and Luck, 2009). By contrast,
Carruthers (2015, p. 87) proposes that deploying attention to
unconsciously perceived stimuli might increase the processing
of that signal without requiring that the stimuli be encoded
in VWM. That is, one might urge, contra the authors,
that even though participants held the cue in mind over a
delay and performed a distractor task, since the information
was not in any way manipulated, participants’ increased
performance was a mere priming effect, requiring storage only
in VSTM. Unlike STM, which involves only storage, WM
involves not only the maintenance, but also the potential
manipulation of information (Baddeley, 1986; Luck and Vogel,
2013).
As Stein et al. (2016, p. 2) observe, however, a more pressing
problem for these experiments is that they depended upon verbal
reports of cue visibility. Although such subjective measures are
often thought to better reflect perceptual consciousness than
objective ones such as forced-choice discrimination (Merikle
et al., 2001; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011), it is well known that
such reports are prone to response bias (Schmidt, 2015; Peters
et al., 2016). In other words, trials rated 1 (no visibility) might
reflect weak conscious perception of cues, which participants
simply fail to report because of conservative standards for
regarding a stimulus as seen. Supplementary data demonstrate
that participants reported conscious perception of the cue on
roughly half of the trials. Thus supposing, for a hypothetical
experiment, that participants reported conscious perception on
a large majority (e.g., >90%) of trials, only 10% of trials would be
analyzed. Clearly such evidence of unconscious VWM would be
met with skepticism.
For that reason, objective measures of perception, such as d′
(the signal-to-noise ratio; MacMillan and Creelman, 2005), are
typically preferred. Although Soto et al. (2011, p. R912) reported
d′, they based their calculation only on trials with a rating of 1 and
thus, as noted by Stein et al. (2016, p. 2), their reported pseudo-d′
is not a bias-free measure. Although in their reply to Stein et al.
(2016), Soto and Silvanto (2016) report the actual d′, it is not clear
whether it is statistically significant.
It is also important to note that most studies of unconscious
VWM implicitly assume a slot model and that, according to
continuous-resource models, the fundamental metric is not
the number of objects stored but instead a precision of each
representation, which can vary between items and between trials.
It is thus more plausible to suggest that low (although above
chance) performance in Soto and colleagues’ study stems from
the noisy encoding of cues, which were presented briefly and then
masked.
Although not discussed by Stein et al. (2016), more recent
studies (Bergström and Eriksson, 2014, 2015; Dutta et al., 2014;
King et al., 2016; Trübutschek et al., 2017) have employed
similar approaches and thus suffer from the same concerns
about subjective measures of stimulus visibility. Trübutschek
et al. (2017), for example, used a masking paradigm to render
stimuli invisible in a spatial delayed-response task and collected
behavioral as well as magnetoencephalography (MEG) data in
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perception and WM paradigms. Their study set out to address
two major concerns facing previous studies of unconscious
WM: (1) participants in the previous studies could have
erroneously reported weakly perceived targets as unseen (the
‘‘miscategorization hypothesis’’); and (2) participants could
have made immediate guesses about the target and maintain
these guesses in conscious WM (the ‘‘conscious maintenance
hypothesis’’). Both hypotheses suggest that the results of
previous studies could be due to conscious WM. To test
these hypotheses, Trübutschek et al. (2017) examined event-
related fields, performed time-frequency analyses, and used
machine-learning approaches to dissect neural activity on
seen and unseen trials. Importantly, if the miscategorization
or conscious maintenance hypotheses were correct, neural
signatures on unseen correct trials would resemble neural
signatures on seen trials. The location of subjectively unseen
targets was reported above chance, seemingly confirming
earlier reports of unconscious WM (Soto et al., 2011). Both
conscious perception and conscious WM showed shared brain
signatures; classifiers trained to separate unseen and seen
trials were able to generalize from one task to the other.
Furthermore, conscious perception and conscious WM were
characterized by sustained desynchronization in the alpha/beta
band over frontal cortex and a decodable representation of
target location in posterior cortex. Importantly, such activity
was not demonstrated for targets on unseen correct trials
and classifier generalization was unsuccessful. These results
provide evidence for unconscious WM, possibly suggesting that
synaptic mechanisms support unconscious WM (Mongillo et al.,
2008).
One recent model of unconscious WM supported by synaptic
mechanisms suggests that WM does not implicate attention, but
instead distinct states of WM possibly representing conscious
and unconscious information (Silvanto, 2017). According to
the model, retro-cues (Oberauer, 2001) or TMS pulse (Rose
et al., 2016) may bring non-cued WM content to conscious
experience. This model is consistent with findings showing
that we can attend to unconscious information (Norman et al.,
2013) and that items in unconscious WM are resistant to
distractor interference, which requires attention. This is certainly
an interesting possibility that awaits confirmation.
Trübutschek et al. (2017) note that one of the criteria
for WM is manipulation of stored information (Baddeley,
1986; Luck and Vogel, 2013) and that the content of
putative unconscious WM was not manipulated in their study.
However, the major problem with their study is that, as
in previous studies of unconscious WM, consciousness was
measured using subjective reports. Although MEG evidence
showed desynchronization in the alpha/beta band only for
seen trials and not for unseen correct trials, the masking
procedure can create a variety of visual experiences that do
not necessarily map onto response options. For example, for
briefly presented targets in studies using metacontrast masking,
a target might change the appearance (e.g., brightness) of
the mask, without being perceived (Bachmann and Francis,
2014). In such a case, participants would have some location
information in the absence of the conscious perception of the
target, supporting above-chance performance on subjectively
unseen trials without unconscious WM. If this possibility
could be ruled out, we would have a strong evidence for
unconscious WM.
Some studies of unconscious WM have, however, not
relied on subjective measures of stimuli invisibility. Using the
method of the breaking of continuous-flash suppression (CFS),
Pan et al. (2014) reported biasing of visual perception by
cues held in unconscious VWM. In CFS, a rapidly changing
pattern of Mondrian patterns presented to one eye suppresses
conscious perception of stimuli presented to the other eye
for several seconds (Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005). Pan et al.
(2014) instructed participants to hold in memory a face
cue, which was rendered unconscious by a pattern mask.
Signal-detection analysis showed that d′ was not significantly
different from zero. Using CFS to suppress target face
processing, the contrast of the target face in the suppressed
eye was gradually increased until participants consciously
perceived the face and reported its location. Interestingly,
when the target face matched the initial face cue held in
VWM, the participants’ reaction times were quicker. In a
series of control experiments, the authors showed that this
effect occurs only when the memory cue is maintained in
VWM.
Although Pan et al. (2014) did report that the objective
measure of consciousness, d′, showed that stimuli were
not consciously perceived, their experiments did not require
participants to manipulate the remembered information in
any way. In previous studies (Soto et al., 2011), participants
compared the orientation of a stimulus putatively held in
unconscious VWM to a target stimulus. In this study, by contrast,
unconscious information simply influenced visual processing.
Although some type of memory was clearly involved, this
experiment is thereby subject to the kind of criticism that Prinz
leveled at Hassin et al. (2009) study: that the storage does
not clearly meet the minimal requirements of VWM, which
involve not only the maintenance, but also the manipulation of
information.
Recently, Bergström and Eriksson (2017), conducted an
fMRI study and used objective measure to assess participants’
awareness of memory items suppressed with CFS. Participants
performed a delayed match-to-sample task in three conditions: a
baseline condition with a CFS mask only, a conscious condition
with objects only, and an unconscious condition in which
objects were suppressed with CFS. Participants were first tested
in the pre-fMRI session with a 5 s delay period and then
in an fMRI session with a 5–15 s delay period. On each
trial, participants first performed a recognition task, followed
by YES/NO detection response, and finally they rated their
visual experience on perceptual awareness scale. Only trials
with a rating of 1 (no perceptual experience) on the scale
were selected for the analysis of the unconscious condition.
Although memory performance (d′) on the recognition and
detection tasks was above chance during the pre-fMRI session,
neither was better than chance during the fMRI session.
Multivariate pattern analyses of fMRI data from the unconscious
condition could classify presence vs. absence of memory items in
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prefrontal and occipital cortex, demonstrating the maintenance
of unconsciously presented memory items. The authors further
suggested that maintenance of unconscious representations in
their study depended on persistent neural activity, above activity-
silent synaptic changes, and the results are therefore inconsistent
with the model of unconscious WM proposed by Trübutschek
et al. (2017).
One difficulty with this study is that we have no behavioral
evidence for the maintenance and manipulation of information,
which figures in the operational definition of WM. Although
the authors used objective measures of awareness and showed
that behavioral performance (d′) was at chance, the delay period
during the fMRI session was long (5–15 s), and likely contributed
to decrease in performance; the authors acknowledged that this
and other factors related to fatigue could have played a role
in explaining performance. In future experiments, the authors
could chose to include a set of randomly intermixed trials on
which performance is assessed immediately after the presentation
of stimuli.
A set of studies by Rosenthal and colleagues (Rosenthal et al.,
2010, 2016; Rosenthal and Soto, 2016) on learning higher-order
visuospatial sequences in the absence of perceptual awareness
provides additional evidence relevant for understanding the
relationship between consciousness and WM. The authors
used a dichoptic masking protocol to prevent conscious
perception of a complex second-order visuospatial sequence,
which was presented repeatedly during the learning phase of
the experiment across four monocular locations. Participants
were then prompted to discriminate old from new sequences
and to rate their confidence during the recognition phase of
experiment that followed 20 min later. A control experiment
revealed that participants were at chance in reporting the
eye of origin for individual sequence stimuli. Although
participants were at chance at discriminating old from new
sequences, confidence ratings revealed that learning did occur.
Recognition memory was associated with V1 activity, as a
part of a network that included the hippocampus. Because
the learning of visuospatial sequences requires maintenance
and manipulation of information over several seconds, thereby
meeting the operational definition of WM, these results seem
to provide evidence for unconscious WM. Furthermore, because
recognition memory, that was associated with hippocampal
activation, was probed after a significant delay, these results
also reinforce a strong connection between WM and LTM
systems.
Two issues related to these findings are worth mentioning.
First, the visuospatial sequences were repeatedly presented
to participants and tested for recognition 20 min later. This
methodology differs from typical WM tasks in which target
stimuli are presented only once and tested for recognition
several seconds later. Repeated presentation of stimuli arguably
can induce learning through mechanisms independent of WM.
The second issue concerns the measurement of recognition
memory. Here, the authors showed that both accuracy and
sensitivity (d′) analyses showed no evidence of learning.
It was the usage of metacognitive measures, confidence
ratings and type-2 sensitivity, that demonstrated learning.
The relationship between perceptual consciousness and
metacognitive awareness is not well understood, however, and
some recent studies suggest that metacognitive judgement
is possible in the absence of perceptual sensitivity or
awareness (Charles et al., 2013; Scott et al., 2014; Jachs et al.,
2015).
A recent study by Samaha et al. (2016) examined the
relationship between metacognitive awareness and WM.
Participants performed perceptual and WM tasks for stimuli
that were matched for performance (d′), but that varied in
confidence ratings (metacognitive awareness). If WM depends
on consciousness, then on trials with higher confidence
ratings WM performance should improve. This hypothesis
naturally depends on the assumption that metacognitive
awareness is a good measure of perceptual consciousness.
But the authors found no evidence for this hypothesis,
suggesting that WM is independent of conscious perception.
Although these results are suggestive, it should be noted
that one does need an additional theoretical assumption
to conclude that WM can store unconsciously perceived
items. Some minimal perceptual consciousness of to-be-
remembered items might be required for WM, even if further
increase in metacognitive awareness does not improve WM
performance.
An important issue raised by studies that employ
metacognitive judgments concerns the relationship between
perceptual consciousness and metacognitive awareness.
Jachs et al. (2015) have demonstrated that whereas stimulus
awareness has a strong effect on perceptual discrimination
(d′), the effect on confidence judgments (metacognition)
was much weaker. These results suggest that perceptual and
metacognitive judgments do not operate on the same input
and that metacognition is not tightly linked to perceptual
consciousness. Converging evidence comes from studies on
error detection. Charles et al. (2013) showed that participants
were able to detect their errors above chance even under
subliminal conditions. They proposed that two distinct
mechanisms exist for metacognitive judgments, conscious and
unconscious evaluation systems. Corroborating evidence from
a recent study that evaluated error-monitoring performance in
schizophrenia patients and healthy controls showed that only
conscious metacognition is affected in schizophrenia, whereas
unconscious monitoring performance remained intact (Charles
et al., 2017). These results are important because they suggest
that: (1) if metacognition can be dissociated from perceptual
awareness, then we cannot use metacognitive judgments to
assess perceptual consciousness; and (2) since metacognition is
considered a higher-order process, it strengthens the evidence
that higher-order processes related to WM can be deployed
unconsciously.
WAYS FORWARD IN THE STUDY OF
UNCONSCIOUS VWM
Having examined the current literature regarding the
relationship between consciousness and VWM, we find that
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there is no definitive evidence for unconscious VWM. But we
see no in principle barrier to the demonstration of unconscious
VWM. Thus in closing we offer recommendations for how to
move forward in the study of unconscious VWM, in light of the
lessons gleaned from the work that has already been done.
In short, because of the problem with response bias, proper
experimental design should use forced-choice discrimination
as a measure of consciousness and an indirect measure to
demonstrate storage and manipulation of information.
Moreover, in order to study the unconscious content
of VWM, and not merely VWM’s unconscious operation,
target stimuli must of course somehow be invisible to visual
consciousness. But one well-known pitfall for studies that
involve the technique of visual masking is that it typically
involves brief presentation times and masks that inevitably
degrade the stimuli, thereby reducing their signal strength.
Consequently, some theorists have speculated that the fact
that we have not decisively experimentally demonstrated many
higher cognitive functions occurring unconsciously may be an
artifact of our current methods for masking stimuli (e.g., Lau,
2009; Persuh et al., 2016). Thus, were a legitimate study
of unconscious VWM involving masking to be devised, the
failure of participants to successfully perform the memory task
might be explained not by the fact that the unconsciously
information cannot be encoded in VWM, but by the fact
that unconscious perception, as it is currently studied, is
typically weak. New experimental techniques might be developed
to explore the full extent of unconscious perception and
unconscious VWM (Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005; Persuh et al.,
2016).
For these reasons, blindsight—wherein people with cortical
damage to V1 are capable of discriminating stimuli in their
blind regions (scotoma) though they report no perceptual
consciousness (Weiskrantz, 1986)—may seem to provide a
particularly promising route for studying unconscious VWM.
In blindsight patients, high contrast stimuli can be presented
for unlimited durations. Skeptics regarding unconscious VWM
might regard blindsight responses as drawing on a type of
fast and automatic processing akin to priming, but most
participants in studies of blindsight are not required to make
speeded responses; instead they have several seconds to respond
to visibility and forced-choice discrimination questions. To
respond correctly, unconscious visual information must be
stored and VWM seems a likely candidate. To our knowledge,
however, no study of blindsight has utilized a standard task
for testing VWM, such as requiring participants to manipulate
unconsciously perceived information after a sizable delay
period.
We recognize, however, that there are several criticisms of
blindsight, such as the fact that it arguably involves a form of
degraded normal vision (Weiskrantz, 2009) or that a participant
might unconsciously perceive the stimulus, on that basis make a
conscious guess, and then retain the conscious representation in
memory before responding (Stein et al., 2016). These criticisms
can certainly be addressed with proper experimental design.
Although blindsight is a paradigmatic example of a dissociation
between objective and subjective measures of consciousness, a
modified experimental design could employ a combination of
objective measure of consciousness and an indirect measure of
storage and manipulation of information.
One might, however, prefer evidence of unconscious VWM
in healthy individuals. Lau and Passingham (2006) coined
the expression ‘‘relative blindsight’’ to describe differing levels
of subjective visibility for stimuli in healthy individuals that
were nonetheless matched for objective task performance. It
has been proposed that this approach could be a fruitful
way to study unconscious WM (Samaha, 2015). Although the
original study faced several criticisms (Jannati and Di Lollo,
2012; Balsdon and Azzopardi, 2015), which were addressed in
subsequent studies (Maniscalco et al., 2016; Peters et al., 2016),
the proponents of the relative blindsight paradigm report that
they have abandoned this strategy due to very small, although
reproducible effects (Peters et al., 2016). Relative blindsight
might thus not be a particularly fruitful avenue for future
studies of unconscious WM. A related concern is that relative
blindsight cannot provide direct evidence for unconscious WM,
because we cannot exclude the possibility that some level of
perceptual consciousness is necessary for WM, even if WM
performance is not modulated by further changes in perceptual
consciousness.
Some studies with healthy participants employing CFS, by
contrast, may have provided indirect evidence for unconscious
VWM. Sklar et al. (2012), for example, presented participants
with an equation masked by CSF for up to 2 s and then
asked them to verbalize a visible number. When the result
of the equation and the number were congruent participants
were faster. Individual participants that performed above chance
based on binomial distribution analysis were excluded from the
analyses. Since recent evidence suggests that VWM is engaged
not only for maintenance of visual information but also for items
still in view (Tsubomi et al., 2013), these results arguably suggest
the existence of unconscious VWM. There is, however, some
concern about the replicability of this study (Karpinski et al.,
2017). A more definitive study of unconscious VWM in healthy
individuals might use a similar CFS-based set-up but use a more
traditional task regarding VWM.
Perhaps more pressingly, given the present lack of consensus
regarding the nature of WM and its neural basis, it would
be reasonable for future studies of unconscious VWM to use
set sizes and delay intervals between the presentation of a
to-be-remembered stimulus and the memory task that clearly
separates VWM from other memory systems such as fragile
VSTM.
Lastly, we take it that perhaps the key feature of WM,
which distinguishes it from STM and LTM, is that information
encoded in WM is available for use in ongoing tasks. That is,
such information must be available for manipulation. To be
clear, we do not claim that information stored within VWM
must be manipulated; it is consistent with current models
that such information may simply be stored and forgotten.
But, to count as being encoded in VWM, information must
at least be disposed to be manipulated. Many purported
studies of unconscious VWM that do not involve information
manipulation are open to the criticism that the information
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gleaned from unconsciously perceived targets merely primes
participants or is stored in (fragile) VSTM (Soto et al.,
2011). Perhaps the manipulation of target information might
involve participants’ being primed after mentally rotating
remembered stimuli (Hyun and Luck, 2007) or after performing
arithmetic operations on remembered numbers (see Sklar et al.,
2012).
Whether or not there are ways to modify standard
paradigms for studying WM, any required manipulation of
target information will doubtless increase the difficulty of
such tasks, thus reducing the likelihood that participants can
successfully perform them. Coupling this with the problem that
unconscious stimuli are often weakly encoded, the possibility that
unconsciously perceived information could survive the relevant
delay period to be manipulated may seem remote. But so far as
we see it, there is nothing theoretically that would rule out the
possibility of unconscious VWM.
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